First Patrol
by Mike Dankert
by Mike Dankert
Bridge on Highway 1 near FSB Charlie Brown
I returned to Vietnam in early May 1969 following an emergency leave for my father's funeral. I reported to Alpha Company at Duc Pho and after transport to LZ Charley Brown was further assigned to the first platoon which was guarding a bridge on Highway 1. As its name suggests, Highway 1 was a main route along the east coast of Vietnam. Each day it had heavy traffic that included transport of troops and supplies. The platoon's job was to secure the bridge, make sure it wasn't blown up or booby trapped.
Lt. John Baxter was the Platoon Leader. Capt. Tyson told me he was a good officer and that was indeed my first impression of Lt. Baxter. He looked like an officer should: taller than average, neat in appearance, well spoken and confident. He was older than us. Lt. Baxter assigned me to the 2nd squad as an assistant machine gunner. An assistant machine gunner has two jobs: to protect the machine gunner and to make sure the machine gunner has ammunition to continue firing in the event of contact. The M-60 machine gun fires a 7.62 mm bullet and can fire about 200 rounds per minute. The standard is to have about 1000 rounds for a machine gun but I think we usually had close to 2000. That much ammunition is too much for a single person to carry so others in the squad carry a portion. In a firefight the assistant gunner is responsible for collecting these rounds and getting them to the gunner. Each round is attached to another with a curved clip so that there is a continuous chain of bullets going into the machine gun. As the machine gunner fires, the assistant gunner is responsible for making sure each "bandolier" is joined to make a continuous feed. This isn't something you learn in advanced infantry training, it's all OJT and learned under fire.
Not long after I arrived we were told to patrol the area west of the bridge. It was a flat, open area that ran for some distance, maybe a couple of miles or more, to a ridge line. Didn't seem like much of an assignment to me because you could see quite a distance except for some groves and tree stands. We were going "light" which meant we wouldn't be carrying packs. We took our weapons, a bandolier of M-16 clips (about 200 rounds), a couple of grenades and the M-60 ammo. I don't remember who exactly went but believe it was less than a full squad. We were lead by our platoon sergeant and with him came his RTO (radio telegraph operator), Jerry Ofstedahl our squad leader, Bruce Tufts who carried an M-79 grenade launcher, our machine gunner Dennis Rowe (a biker from Detroit), me and another relatively new guy carrying an M-16.
Off we went. Four "Vets", guys with combat experience, and three guys with little, or in my case, no combat experience. We passed a few villagers leaving the bridge. There were always Vietnamese around trying to sell things like bush hats, (how they got them and we couldn't I don't know) Coke, ice, beer, and probably drugs if we had asked. So far so good, no problem.
We moved out in a staggered formation and I thought "this is just hiking with weapons." No big deal. As we near the ridge line we noticed movement about a third of the way up the side of the ridge off to our right. We halted and watched. We saw a line of NVA soldiers in green khaki and pith-type helmets moving along the side of the ridge on a path that would cross in front of us close enough that we could see their faces. I thought, "bad guys in the open, let's get them because this is what we came for." I don't remember how many in all. More than 10 as I recall, but I stopped counting. I was thinking ahead to the firefight. Instead of firing we were told to get low, stay quiet and let them go by. I didn't understand but I was a new guy and did as I was told. And pass us they did. Later as we waited there we saw the rest of the company and Capt. Tyson coming from the the direction the NVA had travelled. I don't know how they missed them but they had because we heard no shooting. Helicopters also flew over the area but apparently they didn't see them either.
We returned to the bridge and reported to Lt. Baxter. I don't recall anything being said about what we did then or later, but I was a new guy and maybe not part of the information flow at that time.
Sometime after that our platoon sergeant left the field and got a job working in Division headquarters, a relatively safe job. I saw him one time when we went to Chu Lai for standdown but we never spoke about that first patrol. Later I was told he had been pulled out of the field because we never fired on the NVA that day off Charley Brown. I don't know if that is true. I was asked if I thought he made the right decision. I can't say. We had cover and surprise on our side. But we were outnumbered. The platoon sergeant didn't know if the NVA would fight or run. He didn't know what us new guys would do if we got in a fight. Nor could he have known if he would have enough time to call in artillery or if gunships would arrive in time if there was an NVA assault. I don't believe he was afraid to fight. He just chose not to do it that day. It's tough to second guess decisions made in the field. You have to be there to appreciate all the factors that influence those decisions.
Later in my tour the company was on a ridge overlooking a well travelled trail along the river west of Quang Ngai City. As we watched,Viet Cong came out of the jungle onto the trail. They were probably more than 10,000 meters away, just tiny dots, when they first entered the trail but as they came towards us the column stretched out. There must have been close to a hundred VC. They had no idea where we were. As they got closer our artillery FO (Forward Observer) called in artillery. The first round was an air burst, as required by regulations. This was done so that we could see where the rounds would land as a precaution against mistakenly calling in artillery on our own position. An adjustment was called in but the first round had warned the VC and they quickly disappeared. As far as I know there were no VC killed or wounded.
Lt. John Baxter was the Platoon Leader. Capt. Tyson told me he was a good officer and that was indeed my first impression of Lt. Baxter. He looked like an officer should: taller than average, neat in appearance, well spoken and confident. He was older than us. Lt. Baxter assigned me to the 2nd squad as an assistant machine gunner. An assistant machine gunner has two jobs: to protect the machine gunner and to make sure the machine gunner has ammunition to continue firing in the event of contact. The M-60 machine gun fires a 7.62 mm bullet and can fire about 200 rounds per minute. The standard is to have about 1000 rounds for a machine gun but I think we usually had close to 2000. That much ammunition is too much for a single person to carry so others in the squad carry a portion. In a firefight the assistant gunner is responsible for collecting these rounds and getting them to the gunner. Each round is attached to another with a curved clip so that there is a continuous chain of bullets going into the machine gun. As the machine gunner fires, the assistant gunner is responsible for making sure each "bandolier" is joined to make a continuous feed. This isn't something you learn in advanced infantry training, it's all OJT and learned under fire.
Not long after I arrived we were told to patrol the area west of the bridge. It was a flat, open area that ran for some distance, maybe a couple of miles or more, to a ridge line. Didn't seem like much of an assignment to me because you could see quite a distance except for some groves and tree stands. We were going "light" which meant we wouldn't be carrying packs. We took our weapons, a bandolier of M-16 clips (about 200 rounds), a couple of grenades and the M-60 ammo. I don't remember who exactly went but believe it was less than a full squad. We were lead by our platoon sergeant and with him came his RTO (radio telegraph operator), Jerry Ofstedahl our squad leader, Bruce Tufts who carried an M-79 grenade launcher, our machine gunner Dennis Rowe (a biker from Detroit), me and another relatively new guy carrying an M-16.
Off we went. Four "Vets", guys with combat experience, and three guys with little, or in my case, no combat experience. We passed a few villagers leaving the bridge. There were always Vietnamese around trying to sell things like bush hats, (how they got them and we couldn't I don't know) Coke, ice, beer, and probably drugs if we had asked. So far so good, no problem.
We moved out in a staggered formation and I thought "this is just hiking with weapons." No big deal. As we near the ridge line we noticed movement about a third of the way up the side of the ridge off to our right. We halted and watched. We saw a line of NVA soldiers in green khaki and pith-type helmets moving along the side of the ridge on a path that would cross in front of us close enough that we could see their faces. I thought, "bad guys in the open, let's get them because this is what we came for." I don't remember how many in all. More than 10 as I recall, but I stopped counting. I was thinking ahead to the firefight. Instead of firing we were told to get low, stay quiet and let them go by. I didn't understand but I was a new guy and did as I was told. And pass us they did. Later as we waited there we saw the rest of the company and Capt. Tyson coming from the the direction the NVA had travelled. I don't know how they missed them but they had because we heard no shooting. Helicopters also flew over the area but apparently they didn't see them either.
We returned to the bridge and reported to Lt. Baxter. I don't recall anything being said about what we did then or later, but I was a new guy and maybe not part of the information flow at that time.
Sometime after that our platoon sergeant left the field and got a job working in Division headquarters, a relatively safe job. I saw him one time when we went to Chu Lai for standdown but we never spoke about that first patrol. Later I was told he had been pulled out of the field because we never fired on the NVA that day off Charley Brown. I don't know if that is true. I was asked if I thought he made the right decision. I can't say. We had cover and surprise on our side. But we were outnumbered. The platoon sergeant didn't know if the NVA would fight or run. He didn't know what us new guys would do if we got in a fight. Nor could he have known if he would have enough time to call in artillery or if gunships would arrive in time if there was an NVA assault. I don't believe he was afraid to fight. He just chose not to do it that day. It's tough to second guess decisions made in the field. You have to be there to appreciate all the factors that influence those decisions.
Later in my tour the company was on a ridge overlooking a well travelled trail along the river west of Quang Ngai City. As we watched,Viet Cong came out of the jungle onto the trail. They were probably more than 10,000 meters away, just tiny dots, when they first entered the trail but as they came towards us the column stretched out. There must have been close to a hundred VC. They had no idea where we were. As they got closer our artillery FO (Forward Observer) called in artillery. The first round was an air burst, as required by regulations. This was done so that we could see where the rounds would land as a precaution against mistakenly calling in artillery on our own position. An adjustment was called in but the first round had warned the VC and they quickly disappeared. As far as I know there were no VC killed or wounded.